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Introduction
 
Constitutionalism is the idea that government can and should be legally limited in its powers, and
that its authority depends on enforcing these limitations. Lane explains that two ideas are basic to
constitutionalism: (a) the limitation of the state versus society in the form of respect for a set of
human rights covering not only civic rights but also political and economic rights; and (b) the
implementation of separation of powers within the state.[1]  Furthermore, Louis Henkin defines
constitutionalism  as  constituting  the  following  elements:  (1)  government  according  to  the
constitution; (2) separation of power; (3) sovereignty of the people and democratic government;
(4) constitutional review; (5) independent judiciary; (6) limited government subject to a bill of
1.
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individual rights; (7) controlling the police; (8) civilian control of the military; and (9) no state
power, or very limited and strictly circumscribed state power, to suspend the operation of some
parts of, or the entire, constitution.[2]
 
In  other  words,  constitutionalism has evolved to  mean the  legal limitations placed  upon the
rightful  power  of  government  in  its  relation  to  citizens.  It  includes  the  doctrine  of  official
accountability  to  the  people  or  to  its  legitimate  representatives  within  the  framework  of
fundamental law for better securing citizen’s rights.[3] The philosophy behinds the doctrine is
that the people become the best judges about what is and what is not in their own interest.[4] 
Therefore, a constitution which has the spirit of constitutionalism, at least, must limit the power
of  the  state;  guarantee  and protect  the  rights of  the  citizenry;  and regulate  the  process and
procedural paths of authority and accountability.
2.
 
Whilst  constitutionalism  in  the  West  is  mostly  identified  with  secular  thought,[5]  Islamic
constitutionalism has attracted growing interest in recent years. As Ann Elizabeth Mayer points
out,  Islamic  constitutionalism is  constitutionalism which  is  in  some  form based  on  Islamic
principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism which has developed in countries which happen to
be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles.[6] However, what
Islamic constitutionalism entails remains contested among Muslims, as well as among Western
scholars who study the topic.[7]
3.
 
The main question is that “Is the Syar´i`ah compatible with the principle and procedural form of
Western constitutionalism?” This article will answer this question by looking at the arguments put
forth by opponents of Islamic constitutional law and their counter arguments. One group takes
the view that not only the Syar í`ah is sufficient to meet Muslims, needs and therefore Muslims
do not need constitutionalism, but also that the Syar´i`ah as God’s law is above the constitution.
The Syar´i`ah has already provided a unique system of government or politics. Another group
believes that Islam (including the the Syar í`ah) has no relationship with state affairs. According
to this group, it is misleading to enforce the Syar í`ah through a constitution.
4.
 
Although both groups have different arguments, they share the same conclusion: that the nature
and  characteristics  of  the  Syar´i`ah  do  not  permit  them to  acknowledge  the  compatibility
between the Syar í`ah and constitutionalism. This article will offer a different position on this
issue. It argues that the principles of the Syar´i`ahare compatible with constitutionalism either as
a formal source (Egypt and Iran) or be used only as an inspiration to a constitution (in Indonesia).
However,  reform  of  the  Syar í`ah  is  needed  to  articulate  the  procedural  and  institutional






In  this  section,  I  discuss  the  arguments  to  oppose  the  compatibility  of  the  Syar í`ah  and
constitutionalism. The first four arguments are pointed out by fundamentalist groups, while the
rest  are  provided  by  secularist  groups.  As  has  been  pointed  out  above,  although  each
fundamentalist  and secularist  group has its own reasons, they take the similar views that  the
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Firstly,  there  is the  view that  Islamic  law is immutable  because  the  authoritarian,  divine and
absolute  concept  of  law in  Islam does not  allow change  in  legal concepts  and  institutions. 
Therefore, the Syar´i`ah cannot be identified as law in the proper sense, rather it is an ethical or
moral  system of  rules.  The  Syar´i`ah  is  immutable,  regardless  of  history,  time,  culture,  and
location, as it did not develop an adequate methodology of legal change. Muslims may change,
but  Islam will not.  This means that  the  rulings pronounced by the  Syar í`ah are  static,  final,
eternal,  absolute  and unalterable.  In other words,  its idealistic  nature,  its religious nature,  its
rigidity  and  its  casuistic  nature  lead  to  the  immutability  of  the  Syar´i`ah.[8]The  power  of
Syar í`ahis unlimited. This positionis not compatible with the nature of constitutionalism which
limits the power of government.
7.
 
Secondly, the Syar´i`ah is based on the revelation of God. The source of Islamic law is the will of
God, which is absolute and unchangeable. There has always been a close connection between
Islamic  law and  theology.  This  means  that  the  laws  which  do  exist  must  operate  with  the
boundaries  set  by  the  Syar´i`ah.  This  condition  is  in  contradiction  with  the  nature  of
constitutionalism,  which  is  based  on  the  will  of  people.  Following the  point  above,  in  the
Syar í`ah,  sovereignty belongs to God;  not to the people.[9] This means that  the government
must act according to the Syar í`ah. It is argued that the fact that a legislative measure has been
supported by a  majority,  does not  necessarily imply that  it  is a  ‘right’  measure.  It  is always
possible that  the majority, however large and even well-intentioned, is on occasion mistaken,
while the minority, despite being a minority in quantity, is right. What is right and what is wrong
should be based on the Syar í`ah, not on the popular vote.[10]
8.
 
Thirdly, constitutionalism is not drawn originally from Islam. It is a Western product and part of
hegemony. It is argued that adopting constitutionalism, which is outside of Islamic discourse, will
lead Muslims to abandon their own religion.  It  is alleged that  constitutionalism is a  Western
political agenda in order to control Muslim worlds.
9.
 
Fourthly, it is argued that, based on the Qur’¢an(5:3),[11] Syar í`ahis perfect and that it covers
broad topics such as ritual, social interaction, criminal law, and political law.[12] Every single
problem can be  answered by the  Syar í`ah. It  was designed for all times and places and for
universal application to all peoples. Meanwhile, constitutionalism will not (and cannot) provide
answers for all the problems of human kind. Unlike in a secular state, in the Syar´i`ah, there is no
distinction and separation between religion and state. Islam is a  religion and a state  (d´in wa
dawlah). Politics of the state is a part of Islamic teachings, in that Islam is a religion as much as it
is a legal system.
10.
 
Secularisation is seen as the  product  of Western conspiracy and colonialism, directed against
Islam. During the colonial era, accordingly, the  concept  of secularisation was introduced into
Muslim society in order to maintain Western power. With the separation of religion and politics,
the  jih¢ad  would  be  meaningless.  The  word,  and  the  idea  of,  secularisation,  become  the
pejorative terms. Any Muslim scholar who supports this concept would allegedly be seen as a




As has been mentioned earlier, the arguments above are supported by fundamentalist  groups.
Fundamentalism takes the view that the Syar í`ah is not compatible with constitutionalism in the
modern, legal and secular sense. Instead, the Qur’¢an and the Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet)
should be seen as the Islamic constitution.
12.
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Saudi Arabia
 
The  best  model  of  this  fundamentalist  position  is  Saudi  Arabia.  The  Qur’¢¢anand  the
Sunnahbecame  the  Constitution  and  the  Syar´i`ahis  the  basic  law,  implemented  by  the
Syar í`ahcourts with ‘ulam¢a as judges and legal advisors. The head of state is a king, elected by
and from the big Saudi family. The King, assisted by a council of ministers, supervises legislative
and executive institutions, and the judiciary. It has no House of Representatives whose members
are elected by the people, and also no political parties.
13.
 
It is worth noting that demands for reform initiatives led the Saudi rulers to promulgate their 1992
Basic Law, which has been loosely referred to as a kind of constitution, even though it carefully
avoids calling itself one. Having discussed the Basic Law, Ann Mayer comments that “The Basic
Law does not set down constitutional limitations on government or establish a genuine system of
separation of powers and protection for the rights of citizens.”[13]
14.
 
The  evidence  comes  from Article  1  which  provides:  “The  Kingdom of  Saudi  Arabia  is  a
sovereign Arab Islamic state  with Islam as its religion. The Holy Qur’¢an  and the Prophet’s
Sunnah are its constitution. Its language is Arabic, and its capital Riyadh.” Further, Article 44
stipulates:  “The  authorities  of  the  state  consist  of  the  following:  the  judicial  authority;  the
executive authority; the regulatory authority. These authorities co-operate in the performance of




In Article 68, the national Consultative Council, the majlis al-sy¢ur¢a, was established with its
members, all appointed by the King, having powers to give advice to the government on issues of
public interest, whilst in Article 46, the Constitution provides that “The judicial authority is an
independent organ and nobody has authority over the judges except the authority of the Islamic
Syar í`ah.” Another interesting Article is Article 8, which offers a different picture of the basis of
the Saudi state, providing: “Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on the premise
of justice, consultation, and equality, in accordance with the Islamic Syar´i`ah.”
16.
 
Meanwhile, the secular group is in a position to reject the constitutionalisation of the Syar í`ah.
According to this latter group, in Islamic history, the Syar í`ah was never the constitution of the
traditional Islamic caliphate, which was in fact  an “absolute monarchy”. It  is not  possible  to
enforce the Syar í`ah in aconstitutional way, since they contradict each other.This leads to this






According to secularist groups, the Syar´i`ahis not compatible with constitutionalism since the
Syar í`ah is a matter for individual compliance. States do not have the right to intervene nor to
enforce  the  Syar í`ah  law on the  public.  One  may observe  that  Islamic  law began with  the
activities of jurists owing to religious motives, it was not created by state legislation. This results
in the jurists’ conviction of the independence of Islamic law from state control. States should
encourage their citizens’ compliance with the Syar í`ah, such as in paying zak¢at, fasting, going
on the pilgrimage to Mecca, etcetera, but a state cannot force its citizenry to comply. Unlike the
fundamentalists’ view, this group believe in the secular state and, therefore say the Syar í`ah
cannot  (and  should  not)  take  the  place  of  the  constitution.  They  introduce  the  idea  of
18.
E LAW | Constitutionalism and Syar´i`ah http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v11n1/hosen111nf.html
4 of 20 29/07/2014 9:46 AM
de-politicising Islam, and determine it solely as a religious faith, as once articulated by the Islamic
scholar ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq.[14]    
 
In addition, the Syar í`ah was sent down fifteen centuries ago and it is fit only for the conditional,
political and institutional conditions of  that  time.  The  Syar í`ah could be  operated only in a
traditional state (or city-state) which is based on a personal charisma of the leader; not based on
the constitutional system. Fifteen centuries ago, there was no parliament, no check-and-balance
system,  no  judicial  review,  good  governance,  separation  of  powers,  and  so  on.  The
implementation  of  the  Syar´i`ahtherefore  is  in  contradiction  with  modern  institutions  and
concepts. Historically, the decision of the Caliph would be based heavily on his discretion, or his
interpretation of the Syar´i`ah; not on the rule of law. Moreover, constitutions cannot be viable
documents in the absence of the ideological, cultural, and political prerequisites for constitutional




As has been mentioned earlier, the Syar´i`ahdoes not limit  the power of governments. In the
Islamic  tradition,  the  Caliph  could  do  anything he  wanted  without  the  fear  of  facing the
opposition party or even impeachment procedures. The implementation of the Syar í`ah would
lead to an undemocratic state. The power of the Caliph is unlimited. In the words of Bassam Tibi,
“none of them was a legal ruler in the modern constitutional sense”.[15]  One of the reasons was




Moreover, in Islamic history, the world was split into two divisions: the territory of Islam (d¢ar
al-Isl¢am), comprising Islamic and non-Islamic communities which accepted Islamic sovereignty,
and the rest of the world, called the d¢ar al-harb or the territory of war. Muslims enjoyed full
rights of citizenship while others enjoyed only partial civil rights. For instance, a non-Muslim
could not be appointed as a caliph or a president. This means that there would be no equality
before the law, should the Syar´i`ahbe implemented. In other words, the  Syar í`ah  does not
guarantee  and protect  the  rights of  minority  groups.  This condition should be  seen as being





The best model of secular state in the Muslim world is Turkey. The republic that Kemal Ataturk
founded and subsequent leaders have shaped is radically different from the imperial society of
the Islamic Ottoman Empire. The fifth constitution was established in 1982 by the last military
regime after its seizing power in 1980.  The 1995 amendments abolish about 20 articles and the
preamble that stated the people’s will to accept military rule.  Civil servants will be allowed to
engage in collective bargaining and unions may take part in politics.[16] 
22.
 
Turkey  is  a  parliamentary  democracy.  Although  the  population  is  99% Muslim,  the  Turkish
constitution  establishes  the  Republic  of  Turkey  as  a  democratic,  secular  and  social  state,
governed  by  the  rule  of  law  and  respecting  fundamental  human  rights  and  freedoms.[17]
Legislative  power  is  vested  in  the  550-member  Turkish  Grand National Assembly  (TBMM),
whose members are elected to five-year terms by the votes of Turkish citizens over the age of
18.[18] Internationally  recognised human rights are  protected but  can be  limited in  times of
emergency and cannot be used to violate the integrity of the state or to impose a non-secular or
non-democratic system of government. Turkish women gained the right to vote in 1934, well
23.
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ahead  of  women  in  many  other  European  countries.  Turkish  women  do  not  wear  chadors,
burkhas, or any of the head-to-toe coverings.
 
24.   The president and the prime minister divide the functions and executive power of the
president of the United States, in a way similar to the system of government in France. The
Turkish president is the country’s head of state, but he also has important governmental
powers. He is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He signs bills passed by the Grand
National Assembly or may return them for reconsideration. He may call a referendum on
certain issues relating to the constitution. And he decides who among the members of the
Grand National Assembly should have the right to seek to form a government as prime
minister. The president is elected by the Grand National Assembly for one term of seven
years.[19]
 
The prime minister appoints the members of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister and
Council  of  Ministers  share  executive  power,  taking care  of  such  matters  as  foreign  policy,
defense, public works, internal revenue, customs, health, education, and welfare. Usually, as in
most European democracies, the prime minister is the head of the majority party in parliament.
25.
 
According to the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and includes a system of lower courts,
the national Court of Appeals and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has the task
of ensuring the compatibility of laws and administrative acts with the constitution. It may also act
as Supreme Court in hearing cases against high public officials. The first woman was appointed to
the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1932. The Council of State is the highest administrative court.
26.
 
Turkish law is codified, with civil and commercial law originally based on the Swiss system,
administrative law on the French system, and criminal law on the Italian system. Turkey today is
a secular state.[20] Turkey has mosques, churches, and synagogues open to all, but politicians are
forbidden to exploit religion for political purposes.
27.
Is Syar´i`ah Compatible with Constitutionalism?
 
As can be seen from the discussion above, both fundamentalist and secularist groups believe that
the Syar´i`ah is not compatible with constitutionalism. How do we explain their similar positions?
Although both have  similar  views,  they have  different  arguments in  support  of  these  views.
Whilst fundamentalists believe that the Syar í`ah is better than constitutionalism, the secularists
take the position that the Syar í`ah is part of a religious faith, and not a system of government. It
seems  that  both  groups  put  different  interpretations  on  the  word,  and  the  meaning  of,
“Syar í`ah”.   Therefore,  the  notions  of  the  Syar´i`ah  and  its  relationship  with  the  idea  of
constitutionalism will be examined critically.
28.
 
Rejecting Fundamentalists’ and Secularists’ views
 
Firstly,  conversely  to  the  Fundamentalists’  views,  the  Syar í`ah  must  involve  human
interpretation.  Islamic  law  is,  in  fact,  the  product  of  a  very  slow  and  gradual  process  of
interpretation of the Qur’¢an and the collection, verification and interpretation of the Sunnah
during the first three centuries of Islam (the seventh to the ninth centuries CE). This process took
place amongst  scholars and jurist  who developed their own methodology for classification of
sources, derivation of specific rules from general principles, and so forth. 
29.
 
This led the scholars to distinguish between the Syar í`ah and fiqh.  While the Syar í`ah can be30.
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seen  as  the  totality  of  divine  categorisations of  human  acts,  fiqhmight  be  described  as  the
articulation of the  divine categorisations, by human scholars.  These articulations represent  or
express the scholars’ understanding of the Syar í`ah.  This means that jurists or scholars in the
Islamic tradition, however highly respected they may be, can present only their own personal
views or understanding of what the Syar í`ahis on any given matter.  Moreover, the Qur’¢an and
the Sunnah cannot be understood or have any influence on human behaviour except through the
efforts of (fallible) human beings.
 
Bernard Weiss has correctly pointed out that:31.
 
Although the law is of divine provenance, the actual construction of the law is a
human activity, and its results represent the law of God as humanly understood.
Since  the  law  does  not  descend  from  heaven  ready-made,  it  is  the  human
understanding of the law—the human fiqh (literally meaning understanding)—that
must be normative for society.[21]
 
Therefore,  even though the Syar´i`ah is based on the revelations of God, it cannot possibly be
drawn up except through human understanding, which means both the inevitability of differences
of opinion and the possibility of error, whether amongst scholars, or the community in general.
Khaled Abou El Fadl explains further:
32.
 
All laws articulated and applied in a state are thoroughly human, and should be
treated as such. Consequently, any codification of Shari`ah law produces a set of
laws that  are  thoroughly  and  fundamentally  human.  These  laws are  a  part  of
Shari`ah law only to the extent that any set of human legal opinions is arguably a
part of Shari`ah. A code, even if inspired by Shari`ah, is not Shari`ah — a code is
simply a set of positive commandments that were informed by an ideal but do not
represent the ideal. In my view, human legislation or codifications, regardless of
their basis or quality, can never represent the Divine ideal.[22]
 
Secondly, since Syar í`ahinvolves human understanding, the social norms of the Syar í`ah follow
the nature of human beings because they are derived from specific historical circumstances. For
instance, the caliphate was the product of history, an institution of human, rather than divine,
origin, a temporary convenience, and therefore a purely political office. This means that most of
the regulations in Islamic law may be amended, changed, altered, and adapted to social change. 
33.
 
Whilst  the  Qur’¢an  contains  a  variety  of  elements,  such  as  stories,  moral  injunctions,  and
general, as well as specific, legal principles, it should be noted that the Qur’¢an prescribes only
those  details  which  are  essential.  It  thus  leaves  considerable  room  for  development,  and
safeguards against restrictive rigidity. The universality of Islam lies not in its political structure,
but in its faith and religious guidance.
34.
 
Another source of Islamic jurisprudence, secondary only to the Qur’¢an, is the examples and
words  of  the  Prophet  Muhammad,  or  his  Sunnah.  Not  only  do  both  the  Qur’¢anand  the




This leadsto the third source. Ijtih¢ad in Islamic law can be defined simply as ‘interpretation.’ It
is the  most  important  source  of Islamic law next  to the  Qur’¢an  and the Sunnah.  The  main
difference between ijtih¢ad and both the Qur’¢an and the Sunnah is that ijtih¢ad is a continuous
process of development whereas the Qur’¢an and the Sunnah are fixed sources of authority and
36.
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were not altered or added to after the death of the Prophet.[23]
 
Ijtih¢ad  literally means,  ‘striving,  or  self-exertion in any activity which entails a  measure  of
hardship’.[24]  According to al-£Amid´I,[25]  ijtih¢ad  is defined as “the total expenditure of
effort made by a jurist to infer, with a degree of  probability, the rules of Islamic law”.[26]  In this
sense, al-Gaz¢al í defined ijtih¢ad as “the expending, on the part of a Mujtahid, of all that he is
capable of in order to seek knowledge of the injunctions of Islamic law”.[27]
37.
 
The rule of ijtih¢ad originated at the time of the Prophet, when he sent Mu’az  ibn Jabbal to




‘What will you do if a matter is referred to you for judgement?’ Mu’az said, ‘I will
judge according to the Book of Allah.’ The Prophet asked, ‘What if you find no
solution in the Book of Allah?’ Mu’az  said, ‘Then I will judge by the Sunnah of
the Prophet.’ The Prophet asked: ‘And what if you do not find it in the Sunnah of
the  Prophet?’  Mu’az  said:  ‘Then  I  will  make  ijtih¢ad  to  formulate  my  own
judgement.’ The Prophet patted Mu’az ’s chest and said: ‘Praise be to Allah Who
has  guided  the  messenger  of  His  prophet  to  that  which  pleases  him and  His
Messenger’.[28]
 
Ijtih¢adcan be conducted in one of three ways: ijtih¢ad bay¢an´i, ijtih¢ad qiy¢as í and ijtih¢ad
isti®slah í.[29]The  first  (ijtih¢ad  bay¢an´i)  may  be  applied  to  cases  which  are  explicitly
mentioned  in  the  Qur’¢an  or  ®Had í¯s  but  need  further  explanation.  The  second  (ijtih¢ad
qiy¢as í) may be applied to cases which are not mentioned in these two sources, but which are
similar to cases mentioned in either of them. The third method, ijtih¢ad isti®slah´i,  may be
applied to those  cases which are  not  regulated by the  Qur’¢an  or  ®Had í¯s,  and cannot  be
solved by using analogical reasoning. In this case, ma®sla®hah(utilities) is considered to be the
basis for legal decisions.
39.
 
From the short discussion above, it could safely be stated that Ijtih¢adis a tool for Muslims to
understand and practice the Syar í`ah(God’s law)in line with the nature and the characteristics of
human  beings.  Having  performed  Ijtih¢ad,  Muslim  scholars  can  build  a  fresh  theoretical
construct  and a  contextual approach to legal language and legal interpretation, to follow the
dynamic  character  of  human  beings.  The  Fundamentalists’  views  discussed  above  that  the
Syar í`ah is immutable can be rejected. At the same time, the Secularists’ views that Syar í`ahfits
only for the conditional, political and institutional conditions fifteen centuries ago can be refused.
40.
 
Thirdly, the rule of Ijtih¢admight also be seen to indicate “the imperfectness of the Syar í`ah”.
 This means that  the  Syar í`ah alone does not  cover all issues, as claimed by fundamentalist
groups.  The Fundamentalists’ interpretation of QS 5:3, as has been mentioned above, could be
criticised. There is a  school of thought that  the verse is only about the complete and perfect
teachings of Islamic ritual; from prayers to pilgrimage. Another takes the view that after Allah
sent down this verse, there were other verses such as the verse on kalalah.
41.
 
This means that, “This day, I have perfected your religion for you”, should be read in the context
of this verse alone. QS 5:3 actually talks about prohibitions against the eating of some foods,
prohibitions  against  using arrows  to  seek  luck  or  decisions  and  prohibitions  against  fearing
unbelievers. Accordingly, the word ‘perfect’ in this verse should refer to what is permitted and
what is forbidden in Islam. The word ‘perfect’ in this verse does not regulate the establishment of
the caliphate. In other words, from this verse, one could not argue that the Syar í`ah deals with
42.
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any specific form of government. In fact, there is no single verse in the Qur’¢anwhich directly
regulates the power of a state. If the Qur’¢anis a comprehensive compendium of knowledge on
every issue, then why does the Qur’¢anleave this issue without further clarification? As will be
explained below, the Qur’¢anprovides only some basic principles on this matter.
 
Scholars  who  believe  that  Islam  was  meant  to  be  a  political  order  have  performed  their
ijtih¢adon this matter based on their understanding and interpretation of the rule of the Syar í`ah.
Whilst  their  interpretations  should  be  respected  as intellectual exercises,  their  ijtih¢adis  not
legally binding on all Muslims, nor it is regarded as is the Syar í`ahitself. This means that scholars
who have different opinions on this matter have also performed their ijtih¢adand whatever the
outcome of their intellectual activities could not be seen as against the Divine Law. It is safe to




The  secularist  views mentioned  earlier  hold  that  historically  the  power  of  the  caliphs  were
unlimited,  and that  therefore  the  Syar í`ahis not  compatible  with  constitutionalism,  could be
rejected on the grounds that the legitimacy of the unlimited and unchallenged power of caliphs is
based on interpretations and practices which could be altered, amended and modified to suit
different times and places. It is worth noting that the idea of constitutionalism had not yet come
into  existence,  five  or  six  centuries  ago  when  the  caliphate  did  exist.  It  seems that  human
consciousness needed time to recognise the evils of authoritarianism, and reject it in favour of
constitutionalism.  The  Qur’¢an  provided  the  basic  principles for  a  constitutional democracy
without  providing  the  details  of  a  specific  system.  Muslims  were  to  interpret  these  basic
principles in the light of their customs and the demands of their historical consciousness. This
partly explains why Muslims currently need a new reinterpretation or ijtih¢ad.
44.
 
Following on the point above, one may come to argue that the  Syar í`ah is not perfect in the
sense that it is changeable through the ijtih¢adof Muslim scholars; according to the requirements
of different places and times. For instance, Muhammad b. Idris al-Syafi’i (the founding father of
Syafi’i school) changed several of his views in Iraq (qaul qad ím) when he moved to Cairo (qaul
Jad íd). Much earlier before al-Syafi’i, ‘Umar bin Khattab is known as the caliph who practised
ijtih¢adon several occasions, not only when there was no guidance in both the Qur’¢an and the
Had í¯s, but also when he thought that the law mentioned in both sources was no longer suitable
for dealing with the circumstances of his era. The two texts below provide examples of how the
result of ‘Umar’s ijtih¢addiffers from the Prophet’s decision:
45.
 
Narrated  ‘Imran:  ‘We  performed  Hajj  al-Tamattu’  in  the  lifetime  of  Allah’s
Apostle  and  then  the  Qur’¢an  was revealed  (regarding Hajj  al-Tamattu’)  and
somebody [‘Umar] said what he wished (regarding Hajj al-Tamattu’) according to
his own opinion (ra’y)’.[30]
 
Yahya related to me from Malik, from Ibn Syihab, that Muhammad ibn Abdillah
ibn al-Haris ibn Nawfal ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib told him that he had heard Sa’d ibn
Abi Waqqas and al-Dahhak ibn Qays discussing tamattu’ (performing ‘umrahfirst,
then Hajj) in between ‘umrah and Hajj. Al-Dahhak ibn Qays said, ‘Only someone
who is ignorant  of what Allah, the Exalted and Glorified, says would do that.’
Whereupon Sa’d said, ‘How wrong is what you have just said, son of my brother!’
al-Dahhak  said,  ‘’Umar  ibn  al-Khattab  forbade  that,’  and  Sa’d  said,  ‘The
Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, did it, and we did it
with him’.[31]
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‘Umar believed that the situation had changed and this forced him to apply ijtih¢adwhich, in
several cases, caused him to differ from the position adopted by the Prophet. ‘Umar’s decision
not to distribute the lands of Iraq and Syria among the companions furnishes another example.
Muslims insisted on distributing the land among them according to the Prophet’s practice. To all
their contentions ‘Umar replied that if he kept on distributing the lands, where would he maintain
the army to protect  the borders and the newly conquered towns. The companions, therefore,
finally agreed with him and remarked, ‘al-ra’y ra’yuka’ (Yours is the correct opinion). ‘Umar
later found the justification for this decision in the Qur’¢an [59: 6-10].[32] 
46.
 
‘Umar actually preferred actions which benefited Muslims in general,  rather than individuals.
Social justice, in ‘Umar’s time, demanded that conquered lands should not be distributed amongst
the army. Another interesting example occurred when a man was found guilty of theft but ‘Umar,
as a Caliph, did not amputate his hand, because at that time famine ravaged his territory.[33] In
deciding this, it seems that ‘Umar contravened the formal Qur’¢anic injunction.[34] But ‘Umar
was still regarded and respected as one of the four rightly-guided caliphs. The ‘Umar cases above
suggest that the Syar í`ahis not unchangeable.
47.
 
It is important to note that the Syar í`ahis not a single entity. It has many faces, as reflected by
several schools of thought. The Syar í`ah is diverse and practiced differently in different times
and  places.  Syar í`ahis  considered  not  to  be  ‘perfect’  on  the  grounds  that  there  is  much
disagreement  and  disputation  amongst  scholars  concerning the  meaning and  significance  of
different aspects of the sources with which they are working.  For example, one School takes the
view that analogy is one of the sources of Islamic law, while others reject it. It is worth noting
that, as has been mentioned earlier, in the case of al-Syafi’i, the scholars’ work cannot be in
isolation from the prevailing conditions of their communities in local as well as broader regional
contexts. The interpretations of scholars, ‘ulam¢a and mujtahidwould reflect the state of their
human and political consciousness, and usually that of their people, at that particular time and
place. Disagreements between one School and others (and even amongst scholars of the same
School), as history tells us, provide other evidence that the Syar í`ah, as humanly understood,is
not static, final, eternal, absolute and unalterable.
48.
 
The  Qur’¢an  encourages  ethnic  and  other  types  of  diversity  as  blessings  from  God.
Consequently, classic Muslim jurists recognized the fact that what may suit one culture may not
be quite suitable for another. For this reason, they encouraged each country to introduce its own
customs into its laws, provided that these customs did not contradict basic Islamic principles. As
a result, even today, the Islamic laws of Muslim countries differ significantly on various matters.
49.
 
Fourthly, while rejecting the Qur’¢an and the Had í¯sas the Islamic Constitution (fundamentalist
view), at the same time, I also reject the secularist view that Islam is a religion, in the Western
sense, which regulates only the relationship between man and the Supreme Creator. The Qur’¢an
and the Had í¯s cannot be seen as the Islamic Constitution, but  perhaps as its Code of High
Constitutional Principles. They comprise guidance on legislation, morality, and meaningful stories
which, unlike other constitutions and laws, were un-systematically recorded. As will be explained
in the next section, although both the Qur’¢an and the ®Had í¯sdo not give their preferences for
a definite political system, both primary sources have laid down a set of principles, or ethical
values and political morals, to be followed by Muslims in developing life within a state.
50.
 
For instance, Muhammad Husayn Haikal takes the view that Islam does not provide direct and
detailed guidance on how the Islamic community shall manage state affairs. According to him,
Islam does lay down the basic principles for human civilization, nor basic provisions to regulate
human  behaviour  in  life  and  in  association  with  fellow  humans,  and  which,  in  turn,  will
51.
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characterise  the  pattern  of  politics.  In  short,  according  to  Haykal,  there  is  no  standard
government system in Islam. The Islamic Community is free to follow any government system, as
long as it assures equality among its citizens, both in rights and responsibilities, and also in the
sight of the law, and manages affairs of state based on the sy¢ur¢aor consultation, by adhering to
the moral and ethical values taught by Islam for mankind’s civilization.
 
Haykal believes that a governmental system according to Islamic provisions is a system assuring
freedom and which is based on the principle of the appointment of a head of state having the
people’s  approval,  and  that  the  people  have  the  right  to  control  the  implementation  of
government  and  to  call  on  the  government  to  give  account  of  its  actions.  Islam appeals  to
mankind, especially Muslims, to make an effort to carry out those above-mentioned principles as
far as possible. This position is a middle position between fundamentalist and secularist views. In
this  context,  one  may  see  that  Haykal’s  views  clearly  oppose  the  strict  opinions  raised  by
fundamentalist  groups,  that sovereignty belongs to Allah; not to the people. However, at  the
same time, Haykal also opposes the view that Islam does not teach methods of living within a
community and within a state.[35]
52.
 
The first four counter-arguments above specifically reject some ideas of the incompatibility of
the  nature  and the  characteristics of  the  Syar´i`ahand constitutionalism.  The  next  arguments





Nathan J. Brown points out that the Syar´i`ah does provide such a basis for constitutionalism and
that Islamic political thought is increasingly inclined toward constitutionalist ideas. Whilst it is
true that attempts to put these ideas into practice have not so far been successful, the problem
could be seen to lie in the lack of attention to the structures of political accountability, rather than
flaws in the concept of Islamic constitutionalism.[36]
54.
 
Brown’s and Haykal’s views, above, lead to the examination in this article of some principles of
the Syar´i`ah which have similarities with ideas of constitutionalism. Azizah Y. al-Hibri explains
some key concepts of Islamic law in order to support the view that the Syar´i`ah is compatible
with constitutionalism. A state must satisfy two basic conditions to meet Islamic standards: the
political process must be based on ‘elections’ or bay'ah; and the elective and governing process
must be based on ‘broad deliberation’ or sy¢ur¢a. These two principles are part of the criteria
employed to determine or to judge Islamic constitutional law. According to al-Hibri, these two
principles, together with other factors (the ruler in a Muslim state has no divine attributes and
there  is no  ecclesiastical structure  in  an Islamic  setting),  indicate  that  there  is,  in  fact,  little
difference between an Islamic constitutional setting and a secular one.[37]
55.
 
Given  the  alleged  parallels  she  discovers  between  the  Charter  of  Medina  and  the  U.S.
Constitution, al-Hibri considers the  possibility that  the  Founding Fathers of the  United States
were directly or indirectly influenced by the Islamic precedent. She notes that Thomas Jefferson
was aware  of  Islam,  since  he  had  in  his  library  a  copy  of  George  Sale’s  translation  of  the
Qur’¢an.  Al-Hibri suggests that  Sale  presented Islam in as fair a  light  as possible, under the
circumstances of the eighteenth century, thereby making the Prophet’s precedent amenable to
Jefferson. Al-Hibri argues that if the founding fathers were, in fact, influenced by the Islamic
model of constitutionalism, then this would “support the argument that American constitutional
principles have a lot in common with Islamic principles. Such a conclusion would be helpful in
evaluating the possibility of exporting American democracy to Muslim countries”.[38]
56.
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Although Al-Hibri’s argument could be considered to have fallen into an apologetic approach,
[39] there is a school of thought that Al-Hibri has attempted to show some similarities between
the two traditions, using the American standard as the standard of evaluation. The comparison
between two legal traditions is, borrowing Patrick Glenn’s term, a multivalent thinking. Glenn
takes the view that all traditions contain elements of others. Western legal traditions may contain
some  of  Eastern  legal  traditions.  In  other  words,  “there  are  always  common  elements  and
common subjects  of  discussion”.[40]Therefore,  Glenn  rejects  the  claim that  a  religious legal
tradition is incompatible or incommensurable with secular legal tradition.  
57.
 
In addition, a Muslim scholar could readily conclude that a Muslim country may choose to be a
republic and still be in compliance with the Syar í`ah,  as long as the vote for the president is
genuinely free, and the consultation among all branches of government is broad. Furthermore, the
existence  of  a  House  of  Representatives  would  ensure  that  the  people's  voice  is  heard  in
legislative matters, even if indirectly. Another scholar, however, may make similar arguments for
a constitutional monarchy based on the British example. One can see that Muslim countries may,
or may not, satisfy the two criteria above, in their constitutions.
58.
 
In relation to the protection of the rights of the citizen, despite some rights which are established
in  the  the  Qur’¢anand  the  Sunnah,  maq¢a®sid  al-  syar´i`ah  (the  objectives  of  Islamic
law)should  become  another  principle  or  criterium of  Islamic  constitutional law.  This view is
supported  by  UCLA  Professor  of  Islamic  Law,  Khaled  Abou  El  Fadl.[41]   According  to
Muhammad Husein Kamali, maq¢a®sid al- syar í`ah is an important but neglected aspects in the
discourse of the Syar í`ah.  Kamali claims that even today many reputable textbooks on U®s¢ul
al-Fiqh  do  not  include  maq¢a®sid  al-  syar´i`ah  in  their  usual  coverage  of  familiar  topics.
Generally those textbooks are more concerned with conformity to the letter of the divine text.
This, directly or not, has contributed to the literalist orientation of juristic thought.
59.
 
The  maq¢a®sid  al-  syar´i`ah  consists  of  the  five  juristic  core  values  of  protection
(al-®dar¢uriyah al-khams) for religion, life, intellect, honor or lineage, and property. Basically,
the Syar í`ah, on the whole, seeks primarily to protect and promote these essential values, and
validates all measures necessary for their preservation and advancement. El Fadl argues that the
protection  of  religion  would  have  to  mean  protecting the  freedom of  religious  belief;  the
protection of life would mean that the taking of life must be for a just reason,  and the result of a
just process; the protection of the intellect would have to mean the right to freedom of thought,
expression and belief; the protection of honor would have to mean the protection of the dignity




As El Fadl also points out, these five core values are not divine, but human values, since they are
developed by Muslim jurists based on their interpretations of the Qur’¢anand the Sunnah. This
could mean that the maq¢a®sid al- syar í`ah   is not limited to the five core values. Ibn Taimiyah
departs  from the  notion  of  confining the  maq¢a®sid  al-  syar í`ah  to  a  specific  number  of
values.[42] Yusuf al-Qardawi takes a similar approach. He extends the list of the maq¢a®sid al-
syar í`ah to include human dignity, freedom, social welfare, and human fraternity among the
higher maq¢a®sidof the Syar í`ah.[43] The existence of additional objectives is upheld by the
weight of both general and detailed evidence, in the Qur’¢anand the Sunnah.
61.
 
A new ijtih¢adcould be performed by considering the theory of the maq¢a®sid al- syar í`ah,
examining the Syar´i`ah as a unity in which the detailed rules are to be read  in the light of their
broader premises and objectives.  This means that by looking at the maq¢a®sid al- syar í`ah, the
62.
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Syar í`ahcould be analysed beyond the particularities of the text. In Kamali’s words, “the focus
is not so much on the words and sentences of the text, as on the purposes and goals that are being
upheld and advocated”.[44]  It  is worth noting that the principles and the procedural form of
Islamic constitutional law could be found through the theory of the maq¢a®sid al- syar í`ah.
 
In relation to the position of religion vis-a-vis the state, another principle or criterium could be
drawn from the Charter of Medina. One of the challenges for Islamic Constitutional law is the
position of Islam (or the Syar í`ah) in the constitution. This could be examined on three levels:
the position of Islam within Muslim community itself, the position of Islam in relation to other
religions, and the relationship between Islam and the state.
63.
 
In  this  context,  the  Charter  of  Medina  is  a  document  reportedly  drawn up  by  the  Prophet
Muhammad (d. 11/632), upon his migration from Mecca to Medina. The document establishes
rights and obligations among the Ansar of Medina, the Muhajir who left Mecca with the Prophet,
and the  Jewish tribes of Medina  as they embarked upon a  new journey of co-existence  and
cooperation  in  the  nascent  Muslim polity  founded in  Medina.   The  text  itself  consists  of  a
preamble  and  forty  seven  clauses  outlining  various  aspects  of  community  organisation,




The Charter of Medina declared all Muslim and Jewish tribes of Medina (apparently, there were
no Christians) to be one community. It also stipulated that Non-Muslim minorities (Jews) had the
same right of life protection (as Muslims); guaranteed peace and security for all Muslims based
on equality and justice; guaranteed freedom of religion for both the Muslims and non-Muslim
minorities (the Jews); and ensured equality between the rights of the Jews of Banu Najjar and
those of the Jews of Banu Awf.[45]
65.
 
Instead of strictly using the text, the spirit of the Charter of Medina could be used as a principle
or criterium of the modern Islamic constitutional law. Although there is not a single word in the
Charter of Medina which referred to an Islamic state, the text states that “where a contention
arises between two parties on a matter, the issue is to be referred to God and to Muhammad for a
decision”. Using both an historical and a legal approach, one may examine the significance of the
ambiguity of texts in a modern pluralistic society.  This would help to clarify the debate between
fundamentalists and secularists on Islam being a religion and a state (d´in wa dawlah).
66.
 
Formal and Substantive Syar´i`ah
 
Thus far,  the  article  has  argued  that  the  principles  of  the  Syar í`ahare  compatible  with  the
principle of constitutionalism. However, the problem remains: how to set a procedural form of
power and accountability into Islamic constitutional law. In other words, how does one explore
and put  the  principles of  the  Syar í`ah,such as sy¢ur¢aand bay’ah,into  a  constitution which
conforms with the  idea of constitutionalism. Should Syar´i`ah  become the primary source by
inserting its elements into a constitution? Should it be present only inspirit or as an inspiration?
67.
 
Kurzman  takes  the  view that,  within  the  Islamic  discourse,  there  are  three  main  tropes  of
Syar í’ah. The first one is the liberal Syar´i’ah which argues that the revelations of the Qur`¢an
and the practices of the Prophet command Muslims to follow liberal positions. The second trope,
the silent Syar´i’ah, holds that coexistence is not required by the Syar í’ah, but is allowed. This
trope  argues that  the  Syar í’ah  is silent  on certain topics,  not  because  divine  revelation was
incomplete or faulty, but because the revelation intentionally left certain issues for humans to
68.
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choose.  The first  trope  of liberal Islam holds that  the  Syar í’ah requires democracy, and the
second trope holds that the Syar´i’ah allows democracy.
 
However, there is a third trope that takes issue with each of the first two. This trope is interpreted
Islam. According to this view, the revelation is divine, but interpretation is human and fallible and
inevitably plural. This third trope suggests that religious diversity is inevitable, not just among
religious communities but within Islam itself.[46]
69.
 
Despite their different opinions, those tropes of Syar í’ah can simply be classified as substantive
Syar í’ah.  It  holds  that  Syar´i’ah  should  be  reinterpreted  in  the  line  of  democracy  and
constitutionalism.  I  would add another  type  of  Syar í’ah’s thought  in contrast  to substantive
Syar í’ah: formal Syar í’ah.  The formal Syar í’ah holds the view that  all constitutional issues
should be based on Syar´i’ah practiced by the Prophet and the companions in Medina fifteen
centuries  ago.  They  refer  to  the  Qur`¢an,  the  tradition  of  the  Prophet  and  even  Medina
Constitution. Whilst fundamentalist group believes that Syar í’ah is above the constitution and,
therefore, it  is incompatible with constitutionalism, the formal Syar í’ah  group takes the view




Egypt  is an interesting model of how the  country put  Syar í’ah  provision in the  constitution
through amendment of the constitution.[47]From the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Constitution of
1980, it can be said that Egypt is a democratic socialist state. Islam is the state’s religion. The
Syar í`ahhas been made the main source of law. However, sovereignty belongs to the people and
the people are the source of the State’s power. Egypt follows a multi-party system. All citizens
have equal legal status. They have equal rights and responsibilities, without distinction based on
race,  heredity,  language,  religion  or  belief.  According to  the  Constitution,  the  State  assures
freedom of expression,  and of establishing or joining associations or political parties.  On the
requirements for those elected as Head of State, aspirants for President shall be citizens of Egypt,
progeny of an Egyptian father and mother, not have lost their civilian and political rights, and be
at least 40 years of age. The condition of being Muslim is not included.
71.
 
In  1980  Egypt  amended  Article  2  of  the  Constitution.   The  wording of  Article  2  of  the
Constitution was thus changed from  mab¢adi’ al-Syar í`ah al-Isl¢amiyyah ma®sdar ra’is í li
al-tasyr´i’  (The Principles of the Islamic Syar í`ah are a principal source of legislation) to the
more  forceful  statement,  mab¢adi’  al-Syar´i`ah  al-Isl¢amiyyah  al-ma®sdar  al-ra’is í  li
al-tasyr´i` (The Principles of the Islamic  Syar´i`ah are the principle source of legislation). The
act of amending Article 2 was a concession by the Government to Islamists, and it implied that
the Islamic Syar í`ahwas henceforth to have a more important role in Egyptian society.[48]
72.
 
It was, however, unclear exactly what the new Article 2 meant, nor exactly what it committed
the  government  to  do.  The  dispute  over  the  meaning of  Article  2  centered  on  two  crucial
interpretive questions: what did it mean for the Syar í`ahto be “the chief of source of Egyptian
legislation,” and what was the “Islamic Syar í`ah?” The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt




Another example of formal Syar´i’ah group is Iran. The foundation for Islamic Republic of Iran
is based on a new Constitution (after the Islamic revolution) which was established in 1979 and
was amended in 1989. According to Article 4 of the Constitution, all laws and regulations in civil,
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criminal, political and other aspects shall be based on Islamic principles.
 
The  1979 Iranian  Constitution  is  based  on  religious sovereignty  in  terms of  the  doctrine  of
wil¢ayat  al-faq íh  (governance  of  the  Islamic  jurist)  introduced  and  coined  by  Ayatullah
Khumayni).[50]  However,  one  could  find  borrowed  Western  institutions  which  lack  Islamic
antecedents, such as the republican form of government, the division of the government into
three separate branches (separation of powers),  a  directly elected president  who functions as
chief executive, a prime minister and cabinet, the ideas of the independence of the judiciary and
judicial review, the concept of legality, the notion of an elected legislative body, the need for the
cabinet to obtain votes of confidence from the legislative branch, and the concept of national
sovereignty. Such rules have counterparts in Western political systems, therefore one could argue
that they bear no relation to the traditional function of the Syi`ahSchool.[51]
75.
 
Mayer goes further by explaining that:76.
 
In many facets, and its general format, the Iranian constitution resembles the 1958
French constitution. The way Islamic content  has been injected into provisions
with French antecedents can be illustrated by comparing the treatment of national
sovereignty in article 56 of the Iranian constitution with article 3 of the French
constitution. The French version establishes that sovereignty rests on the will of
the people  as expressed through referendums and enjoins interference with the
exercise of popular sovereignty. It  begins: “National sovereignty belongs to the
people, which shall exercise this sovereignty through its representatives by means
of referendums. No section of the  people,  nor any individual,  may attribute  to
themselves  or  himself  the  exercise  thereof.”  In  Chapter  5  of  the  Iranian
constitution under the heading “The Right of National Sovereignty and the Powers
Derived from It” one sees in article 56 the Islamized version of the same provision,
in  which  the  theological  tenet  that  God  is  Supreme  Ruler  is  inserted  and  the
French  provisions  enjoining  interferences—this  time  with  Divine
Sovereignty—have been incongruously retained: “Absolute sovereignty over the
world and mankind is God’s and He alone has determined the social destiny of
human beings. None shall take away this God-given right from another person or
make use of it to serve his special personal or group interest.” Wanting to retain
the  provision  for  popular  referendums,  the  authors  of  the  Iranian  constitution
relegated it  to article  59,  by which placement  the  clash between the  idea  that
national sovereignty is exercised by the people via referendums and the idea that
sovereignty is the exclusive province of the deity has been rendered less obvious. 
The incongruity remains: there is no room for popular sovereignty exercised via
referendum in a system based on the theological premise of divine rule, which at
the  very  least  should  mean  that  God’s  laws  are  binding  and  not  subject  to
modification by any human agency, such as popular referendums involve.[52]
 
However,  the  1979  Iranian  Constitution  contains  some  startling new elements.  Alongside  a
popularly elected Assembly and President, the Constitution designated a Leader and a Council of
Guardians. The authority of these new institutions is such that Chibli Mallat has described them
as forming a second tier of the separation of powers, on top of the more traditional separation




Meanwhile, Indonesia’s constitutional reform has used the substantive Syar´i’ah approach. This78.
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holds that  the  Syar í’ah,  in this context,  should be  reinterpreted in line  with democracy and
constitutionalism.  Indonesia  is  neither  secular  nor  Islamic  countries.  The  two largest  Islamic
organization —Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama(NU)— strongly oppose state enforcement
of  Islamic  law,  the  Syar´i`ah,  as  conceived  by  Islamic  political parties  (PPP  and  PBB).[54]
However,  leaders  of  the  Muhammadiyah  and  the  NUdo  not  refuse  that  the  spirit  of  the
Syar í`ahmight contribute to the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution. It is safe to argue that
they took the middle position between secularism and fundamentalism.[55]
 
In August 1945, at the last moment, seven words from the Preamble to the Constitution (known
as the Jakarta Charter) were removed and thus excluded from the Constitution. The seven words
involved a requirement  for Muslims to implement  Syar í`ah. Therefore, the  Constitution only
states  that  “The  State  shall  be  based  upon  the  belief  in  the  One  and  Only  God”  (Article
29).However, according to the President’s Decree in 1959, the Jakarta Charter ‘gives life’ or
‘influences’ (menjiwai) to the 1945 Constitution and that it forms an inseparable unity with the
Constitution. Consequently, although the Charter was not one of the sources of Indonesian law,
there  should  be  no  law or  government  regulation  which  contradicts  the  spirit  of  the  1945
Constitution (i.e. the Jakarta Charter).[56]
79.
 
Unlike in Egypt, in 2002, the Indonesian MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) rejected the
efforts of Islamic political parties to re-insert the seven words “dengan kewajiban menjalankan





Constitutionalism means the sovereignty of the people, elected government accountable to the
people, government being guided by constitutional prescriptions and limitations, constraints on
government  pursuant  to  principles  of  human  rights,  preclusion  of  extra-constitutional
government,  and adequate  institutions to  ensure  that  constitutional rules are  observed.In this
article,  I  argue  that  the  Syar í`ahis  compatible  with  constitutionalism.   I  believe  that  the
Syar í`ahis  not  static  and  final.  As  has  been  argued  earlier,  it  can  be  amended,  reformed,
modified or even altered, without neglecting its fundamental basis. The Syar´i`ahis changeable
and adaptable to social change. The Syar´i`ah, as humanly understood, follows the dynamics and
the characteristics of human beings.  The revelation is divine, but interpretation is human, and
fallible and, inevitably, plural. It is also suggested that religious diversity is inevitable, not just
amongst  religious  communities,  but  within  Islam  itself.  This  position  rejects  both
theFundamentalists’ (as in Saudi Arabia) and theSecularists’ views (as in Turkey) on this subject.
Instead, the principles of the Syar í`ah could be a formal source (as in Egypt and Iran) or be used
only as an inspiration to a constitution (as in Indonesia).
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